The High Court recently refused an adoption order, serving as a cautionary tale for those attempting to use domestic legal processes to bypass the rigorous safeguards that exist to regulate intercountry adoptions.
Facts:
‘D’ is a woman who was habitually resident in the UK. She applied for a domestic adoption order in respect of a seventeen-year-old girl, F, who was brought to the UK from Nigeria in 2021 under the Adoption and Children Act (ACA) 2002. D claimed that F was her daughter by way of a prior adoption in Nigeria in 2019 and asserted that she had brought the teenager to the British Isles merely for a holiday, although D maintains that she is not related to F.
AF, who lives in Nigeria, is claimed to be F’s father, while RF, F’s mother, is said to be deceased. There has, however, been some difficulty in confirming the death of RF.
The legal background was complicated by the fact that Nigeria is a restricted country for adoptions due to systemic concerns surrounding child trafficking, corruption, and unreliable documentation. The evidence presented by D was riddled with inconsistencies, with the Court being presented with no fewer than three different birth certificates for F, one of which was not even registered until nine years after her birth. Moreover, there was no reliable proof that RF is actually deceased.
Furthermore, D’s visa application for F had falsely stated that both of F’s parents were dead, yet F maintained regular contact with a man in Nigeria she identified as her father. D also failed to seek the mandatory legal exemption from the Secretary of State required for bringing a child from a restricted country into the UK for adoption.
Beyond the procedural irregularities, the case involved serious safeguarding issues within D’s household. Evidence emerged that F had been exposed to significant domestic abuse and coercive control from D’s husband, BD, culminating in an incident in February 2025 in which F had to call the police to protect both herself and D. Despite this history of violence, D appeared dismissive of F’s emotional needs and the potential trauma she had experienced. The Court also noted a highly unusual sleeping arrangement in which F, despite being nearly eighteen, shared a bed with D.
Decision:
The High Court dismissed D’s application for an adoption order for F. The Court’s reasoning was centred on public policy and child welfare, concluding that granting the adoption would be contrary to the law and detrimental to the teenager’s long-term interests. Under the Welfare Checklist, the Court found that an adoption order would likely not serve F’s best interests.
The Judge first determined that D had breached Section 83 of the ACA 2002. Despite D’s claims that F came for a holiday, the Court found that her subjective intention was always to obtain an English adoption order. Moreover, as Nigeria is a restricted country, D was legally required to seek an exception from the Secretary of State based on “exceptional circumstances,” which she had failed to do. The Court reasoned that these regulations exist to prevent child trafficking and the exploitation of vulnerable families abroad. Granting an adoption based on such striking inconsistencies and questionable documentation could only undermine the integrity of the UK’s protective framework. The Judge made it clear that the Court would not allow such a “fait accompli” to bypass mandatory safeguards simply because the child was already in the country.
Implications:
Historically, some applicants have believed that, if they could successfully bring a child to the UK and establish a life together, the courts would somehow feel compelled to grant an adoption order to avoid uprooting the child. This case reinforces the understanding that physical presence and emotional bonding alone do not guarantee an order. The Court ruled that it will not “acquiesce” to a situation built on illegal entry or deceptive documentation, even if the child wishes to stay. The Judge sent a stern message that the Court will not allow the domestic adoption process to be used as a “backdoor” to bypass international adoption safeguards or immigration controls.
This judgement clarifies the relationship between Section 1 of ACA 2002 (relating to welfare) and Section 83 (governing public policy). While welfare is the paramount consideration, it must be viewed through the lens of the child’s entire life. The Judge reasoned that it is not in a child’s long-term interest to have a legal identity founded on fraud, exploitation, or the manipulation of child trafficking laws. While the Judge rejected a formal “most exceptional circumstances” test, he made it clear that when a country is on the Restricted List, the burden is on the applicant to address any specific concerns in relation to trafficking and corruption.
The case clarifies the limits of S v Bradford. While the “practical benefits” of British citizenship are a valid welfare factor, they are not a “trump card”. The Court will not allow adoption to be used as a “parallel immigration structure”. If the underlying parent-child relationship is “transactional” in nature, for instance, to obtain a visa or to aid a struggling relative, then the Court is likely to refuse the order.
