By ordering a new trial, the High Court confirmed that courts must look at whether a family member might have been “authorised, encouraged, or instigated” by the primary abuser.
Background:
The facts of this case centre on a long-term history of alleged harassment stemming from the appellant’s previous relationship with a man identified as Mr. X. The appellant, who describes herself as a victim of serious sexual violence by Mr. X, maintains a 2023 non-molestation order (NMO) against him. However, the legal dispute has since shifted to the son of Mr. X and, as the appellant and the respondent were never in a formal domestic relationship, she has sought protection under the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 1997 rather than under family law provisions.
The County Court Judge dismissed both the appellant’s claim and her application for an injunction in December 2024. While the Judge found the appellant a credible witness, he nonetheless concluded that her evidence failed to meet the legal threshold for a “course of conduct” under the PHA 1997. The appellant appealed the decision and, in December 2025, following a new event, issued a fresh application, seeking an injunction in the County Court.
Decision:
The High Court decided to allow the appeal and set aside the Lower Court’s order, effectively overturning the original dismissal of the harassment claim. However, rather than granting the injunction immediately, the High Court ordered a new trial that will incorporate the previously ignored allegations. This new trial will be combined with the appellant’s most recent claim regarding incidents from late 2025, ensuring that the County Court considers the entire history of the behaviour as a single continuous case.
The High Court found that the original Judge did not rule on, or even mention, two significant allegations contained in the appellant’s witness statement. The first was a March 2024 incident in which the respondent allegedly swerved his vehicle toward the appellant to frighten her. The second was a September 2021 incident involving a filming session and a false police report. The High Court emphasised that, because these were part of the alleged pattern of harassment, the Judge had a legal duty to determine whether they in fact happened.
The original Judge had dismissed the case, as the three incidents he did consider were deemed ‘too far apart’ to constitute a “course of conduct”. The High Court reasoned that if the Judge had taken into account the swerving incident and the false police report, the “gaps” between events would have been smaller and the pattern of behaviour would have appeared much more serious. This additional evidence could have tipped the balance in favour of finding a legal course of conduct.
Implications:
From a family law perspective, this case highlights a critical gap in legal protection and how “non-family” law often has to step in to fill it. The primary implication is that family law protections are not universal, as they are strictly tied to the nature of the relationship between the two people involved.
In the UK, the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996 allows potential victims to obtain protection orders, or NMOs, against “associated persons,” usually including spouses, cohabitants, or other close relatives. In this case, the appellant had a child with Mr. X, making them “associated”. However, in this case, she had no direct domestic or romantic relationship with the respondent, Mr. X’s son, even though they are connected via the father. However, the law does not always view a former partner and their ex-partner’s adult child as being sufficiently “associated” to warrant a Family Court injunction. If a family member of your abuser starts harassing you, you may be forced to leave the relatively “user-friendly” Family Court and sue them in the Civil County Court instead.
Because the appellant could not use family law, she had to use the PHA 1997. While this still offers protection, the “rules of the game” are different: first, the standard of proof is higher, requiring a clearly identifiable course of conduct. Second, civil courts can be stricter about timelines and how “connected” incidents are compared to family courts, which often look more broadly at the “climatology” of domestic abuse.
