The High Court confirmed the extension of payments beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday to cover the period of their tertiary education.
Facts:
This appeal concerns the extension of the duration of a child maintenance order (CMO) beyond the age of eighteen for a child born in February 2006. The appellant is the child's father, a qualified solicitor, and the respondent is the child's mother, a qualified, although non-practicing lawyer. Both parents chose to represent themselves.
The mother informally applied to extend the CMO's duration in a skeleton argument for a hearing in January 2024, while the father claimed he was not given notice of this application. At a subsequent hearing in April 2024, the Judge extended the CMO until August 31, 2028, to cover the child's tertiary education. The father appealed this decision, arguing a lack of notice and that the order's length was excessive.
Decision:
The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order extending his CMO payments past the child's 18th birthday until the conclusion of her tertiary education. The Court found that the father was, in fact, given sufficient notice of the application to extend the CMO. While the mother's application was made informally within a skeleton argument for the January 2024 hearing, the Judge determined this was a valid form of notice in family proceedings. The Court also noted that the father was present during the January hearing when the mother orally raised the issue and explicitly referred to her skeleton argument. Furthermore, the mother sent an email to the father in February 2024, specifically mentioning the application to extend the CMO. Since both the informal application and the father's notification occurred before the child's 18th birthday, the Court had the power to make such an order.
The Court also rejected the father's argument that the extension was too long. The Judge had the statutory power to extend the order under Section 29(3)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973, which allows for orders to continue past a child's 18th birthday if they are in full-time education. The mother had presented a "cogent case" that the child's tertiary education would likely last until August 2028, while the father failed to present any evidence or a compelling argument to counter this claim. The Court concluded that the Judge was entitled to make the order for the duration he did.
Implications:
The most significant implication is the Court's endorsement of informal applications within existing proceedings. The judgement explicitly states that an application to extend a CMO, even one made in a skeleton argument, can be considered valid. It prevents the need for separate, formal applications, which can cause delays and increase legal costs. It also places a greater burden on parties, especially those who are self-represented, to be attentive to all documents and oral arguments made in court. A party cannot simply claim a lack of notice if the application was raised at a hearing they attended or in a document they received, even if the method was unconventional.
The case reaffirms the Court's statutory power under Section 29 of the MCA 1973 to extend CMOs. It makes it clear that the Court has a clear power to extend payments beyond a child's 18th birthday if they are in full-time education or training.
